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Introduction 
One evening while I was living in Moscow as a student, a Russian friend of mine 
invited me to a concert. I was unfamiliar with the band, but he assured me they were one 
of the most popular groups in the country. When we arrived at the club at which the 
concert was to take place, we were stopped at the door by two strikingly beautiful 
Russian women who informed us that the tickets for the concert cost fifteen thousand 
rubles – about five hundred dollars. My Russian friend, unperturbed, mentioned the name 
of an acquaintance that apparently worked at the club. Although the name meant nothing 
to me, the women’s faces lit up and they welcomed us inside without asking for a single 
kopek. 
This was just one example of how I learned that in Russia, who you know is often 
more important than what you do or how much you earn. While the use of one’s personal 
connections for access to lavish clubs and expensive concerts might seem like just 
another byproduct of post-Soviet excess, it is actually rooted in Soviet traditions that 
developed in conditions of shortage. The use of personal connections to gain access to 
hard-to-find goods or services is known as blat, and it continues to play an important role 
in modern Russian society. In fact, blat – and the corruption that the practice often 
engenders – remains the main stumbling block for many firms trying to do business in 
Russia. This has been especially true for foreign companies, who have been deterred 
from investing in what they see as an unpredictable and difficult to access environment. 
Much of this perception is due to the opacity of the Russian business sphere, in which 
personal ties and informal agreements are often more important than official contracts. 
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By discouraging foreign investment, corruption and blat have stalled development and 
made Russia a peripheral player in international business. Russia is still considered to be 
an important market for many Western corporations, but the risks of investing there often 
outweigh the potential returns. Russia’s unfriendly business climate has deterred foreign 
investors, leading to slower growth for the country’s economy as a whole. I argue that 
blat, and the corruption that results from it, is the main reason behind Russia’s straggling 
performance.  
Despite the importance of blat in both the Soviet and post-Soviet environment, 
surprisingly little research has been done on the phenomenon. Some of the most 
instructive work has been done by Alena Ledeneva, a political scientist who has 
contributed extensive research tracing the cultural origins of blat (1998; 2008). Ledeneva 
has provided us with the most comprehensive overview of the historic roots and the 
cultural characteristics of the phenomenon. She explains blat as an exchange of favors, a 
system in which people form personal connections in order to gain access to goods or 
services that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. Her more recent studies have 
commented on the political aspects of the phenomenon and the role of blat in the Russian 
market economy, but do not fully explore the consequences of blat in a business 
environment. She also focuses mainly on the consequences of blat for Russians 
themselves, and does not address the effect that the phenomenon has on foreign entrants 
in the Russian market. 
Many recent studies have focused on the post-Soviet business environment, and 
the important role that networks and connections play in Russia (e.g. Batjargal, 2003; 
Hunter, 2003; Michailova & Worm, 2003). These studies, among others, have found that 
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informal personal connections remain an important factor when doing business in Russia. 
In fact, belonging to a business network was often found to be the main determinant of 
success in the post-Soviet environment. However, these studies do not always link the 
use of connections in the current business environment to the phenomenon of blat. Those 
that do refer to blat do not fully explore the cultural origins of the phenomenon. Others 
have explored the differences in business ethics between Western and Russian firms, and 
the challenges that Western investors face when entering the Russian market (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 1995; Ariño et al., 1997; Barnes et al., 1997; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). 
These articles emphasize cultural differences between Russian and Western 
businesspeople, such as the Russian desire to form close personal relationships with 
business partners, and the Western inclination toward more formal arrangements. These 
authors have also tended to emphasize the problems associated with Russian corruption. 
While these studies are instructive, they do not address the root cultural causes of the 
differences between Russian and Western business practices, and therefore leave Western 
investors without a full understanding of the Russian business environment. 
Previous studies, while informative, have focused on historical, cultural, or 
business angles of blat. However, these are just individual pieces of a much larger puzzle. 
I hope to contribute to the understanding of the post-Soviet business environment by 
providing a more complete picture of blat – a scholarly study of this peculiar cultural 
phenomenon. My approach differs from that of other authors in that it gives a 
multidisciplinary analysis of blat, with the goal of providing more complete insight into 
the challenges of doing business in Russia. By combining cultural and literary evidence, 
historical information, and analysis of Russian business practices, I hope to provide a 
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comprehensive overview of blat in the Soviet and post-Soviet environment. A more 
complete understanding of the use of connections will allow us to better understand the 
Russian business environment and how blat affects Western firms. 
This paper begins by tracing the origins of blat in Soviet society and examining 
the transformation of the phenomenon during the transition to a market economy. It then 
looks at the instrumental role blat plays in contemporary Russian business, and how this 
distinctly Soviet phenomenon affects Western companies who invest in Russia today. By 
looking at the cultural roots of the use of personal connections in Russian business and 
examining the experience of Western companies in Russia, I hope to provide additional 
insight into the difficulties that foreign companies face when entering the Russian 
market. With a fuller understanding of the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of the Russian 
business environment, multinational corporations may be better prepared to succeed in 
their Russian ventures, or at least better informed when making the decision to invest 
there. 
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I. Blat: The Soviet Economy of Favors 
Background 
Blat is a uniquely Soviet word that refers to the use of connections to obtain 
goods that are in short supply. As the economist Joseph Berliner (1957) eloquently put it, 
blat is “one of those many flavored words which are so intimate a part of a particular 
culture that they can be only awkwardly rendered in the language of another” (p. 182). 
Indeed, the concept of blat is difficult to define. The word implies “the use of personal 
influence for obtaining certain favors to which a firm or individual is not legally or 
formally entitled” (Berliner, 1957, p. 182). According to political scientist Alena 
Ledeneva, who has done more recent work on the phenomenon, the term blat refers to 
“the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short 
supply and to find a way around formal procedures” (1998). Thus, blat involves the use 
of personal connections to circumvent the rigidity of the Soviet command economy. In 
this chapter, I will attempt to trace the origins of blat and its evolution throughout the 
Soviet period.  
 
A working definition of blat 
Given its multiple definitions, its evolution over time, and the varied contexts in 
which it is used, the term blat can be difficult to define. Ledeneva attempts to summarize 
blat’s features with the following definition: 
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Blat was an exchange of ‘favours of access’ in conditions of shortages and a state 
system of privileges. 
A ‘favour of access’ was provided at the public expense. 
It served the needs of personal consumption and reorganized the official 
distribution of material welfare. 
Blat exchange was often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of friendship or 
acquaintance: ‘sharing,’ ‘helping out,’ ‘friendly support,’ ‘mutual care,’ etc. 
Intertwined with personal networks blat provided access to public resources 
through personal channels. (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 37) 
This definition can help guide an analysis of whether blat continues to operate in 
contemporary Russia. Such analysis, however, also requires a better understanding of the 
history of blat, its evolution through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and its current 
role in the post-Soviet period. 
Blat’s significance in the Soviet period can be attributed to the unique nature of 
the Soviet command economy. The Soviet Union relied on central planning, rather than 
market forces, to determine the operation of its economy. One of the consequences of 
such a system was a phenomenon referred to as “repressed inflation.” Repressed inflation 
occurs when excess demand on the consumer goods market does not translate into an 
appropriate price increase. This, in turn, leads to shortages, because the price of a 
particular good does not reflect the level of demand (Brus & Laski, 1983). Indeed, 
according to surveys of Soviet citizens, the main difficulty in purchasing necessary items 
was simply their absence from store shelves (Grushin, 2003). Thus, while earning money 
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was necessary in the Soviet economy, money alone was often not sufficient to obtain 
necessary goods and services. 
Because many of the goods Soviet consumers demanded were in shortage, people 
were often forced to queue in order to obtain access to various items. The culture of 
lining up to buy shortage goods is perhaps best described in Vladimir Sorokin’s novel, 
The Queue (1983). First published in 1985, the novel depicts the queuing process as a 
daily ritual in Soviet life. The novel’s characters must stand in line for hours to purchase 
a particular object. Sorokin’s novel satirizes the absurdity of the queuing process as his 
characters are forced to sleep on the street to keep their place in line: “Why don’t we all 
spread out in the square, comrades? We can keep our places in the queue there” (p. 51). 
This process was, of course, a significant use of time for many people. Therefore, the 
ability to skip the queue and obtain shortage goods through other means was invaluable. 
This is where the so-called “shadow economy” came into play. The term shadow 
economy refers to the non-regulated, unreported, or private aspects of economic activity 
(Marrese, 1981). Blat and other aspects of the shadow economy compensate for the 
inadequacies of the official economy, which is plagued by inefficiency, disequilibria, and 
rigidity (Grossman, 1982). As mentioned before, one of the consequences of the official 
economy’s inefficiencies is shortage. In conditions of shortage, “there is a crucial need to 
establish wide-ranging social exchange networks” (Sampson, 1987, p. 131). Blat was the 
practice of establishing and exploiting these social exchange networks, and thus allowed 
many Soviet citizens to gain access to otherwise unavailable goods and services. 
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History of blat 
The term blat dates back to the pre-revolutionary period in Russia. According to 
Max Fasmer’s etymological dictionary, the term came to Russia from the Polish blat, 
which refers to providing a cover or umbrella for someone, and the Yiddish word blat, 
which means close, familiar, or “one of our circle” (1964). The term blat also refers to 
petty criminal activity, such as minor theft. For the purposes of this paper, however, we 
will analyze the more recent, Soviet understanding of the word, referring to what Alena 
Ledeneva terms “the economy of favors” (1998). This usage of the word appeared shortly 
after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.  
Most Russian language dictionaries contain only the pre-revolutionary meaning of 
blat, referring to minor criminal activity. Furthermore, “blat” is “not a ‘polite’ word and 
people of more refined manners are half-embarrassed to use it” (Berliner, 1957, p. 183). 
However, an analysis of sources representing everyday life in the 1920s, such as 
memoirs, letters, and novels, reveals that the word’s meaning did indeed change 
following the revolution. These sources demonstrate that the concept evolved over time 
and eventually became a part of the Soviet system (Ledeneva, 1998). 
It is difficult to find detailed information about blat during the period from the 
1920s to 1940s, most likely due to the questionable nature of the practice and the less 
than polite connotations of the word itself. Nonetheless, certain themes reappear in 
various sources, particularly in satirical periodicals. One humorous example is a poem 
that appeared in the satirical publication Krokodil in 1933. The poem, called “Blat-book,” 
jokingly referred to a notebook in which one kept all the contact information of one’s blat 
connections, along with notes about what could be obtained from whom. The book was 
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like a secret code that instructed the user how to get help: “Just call—and in a minute you 
have ‘Nik. Nik.’ He will get you everything you need” (Lebedev-Kumach, 1933). Useful 
as this blat-book was, the poem cautioned that anyone in contact with such suspect 
characters could wind up at the public prosecutor’s under interrogation. 
Other depictions of blat evoked such themes as its use to get jobs for friends and 
relatives, or to obtain ration tokens for necessary items (Ledeneva, 1998). Blat was also 
used to avoid a reduction in living space, as depicted in the 1925 novel, Heart of a Dog, 
by Mikhail Bulgakov. The novel, which was not published in the Soviet Union until 
glasnost’, depicts the favors available to well-connected citizens in the 1920s. One of the 
main characters, the surgeon Professor Preobrazhensky, is facing a reduction in housing 
space. He is able to avoid losing rooms in his apartment, however, by calling in favors to 
officials on whom he operates. When the house management committee threatens to 
lodge a complaint with the authorities, Preobrazhensky calls the Chairman of the house 
committee, who also happens to be his patient. Preobrazhensky threatens to cancel all of 
his scheduled operations unless the Chairman issues an order ensuring that nobody “will 
be allowed even to approach the door of my apartment. A final and definitive order. An 
absolute one! A real one! Ironclad” (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 28). The Chairman, in response, 
instructs the house management committee to leave Preobrazhensky alone. By using his 
connections, Preobrazhensky is able to hold on to one of the most coveted privileges of 
the 1920s: extra living space.  
Over the course of the 1930s and 40s, blat became more associated with 
consumption of goods that were in short supply. Rather than simply being used for 
necessities, blat was now a means for obtaining more prestigious items, such as books, 
13 
 
food items, clothing, makeup, or vacations. Conversations with people who lived in the 
USSR at that time also reveal a great deal about the importance of blat in Soviet society. 
Many of these personal accounts emphasize the near indispensability of blat connections. 
As concerned citizen Petr Gatsuk pointed out in a 1940 letter to the deputy chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, 
Not to have blat, that’s the same thing as having no civil rights, the same as being 
deprived of all rights…. Come with a request, and they will all be deaf, blind, and 
dumb. If you need…to buy something in a shop—you need blat. If it’s difficult or 
impossible for a passenger to get a railroad ticket, then it is simple and easy po 
blatu. If you live without an apartment, don’t ever go to the housing 
administration, to the procurator’s, but better to use just a little blat and you will 
at once get your apartment.” (qtd. in Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 62) 
According to Gatsuk’s account, blat is not just a useful tool for obtaining sought-after 
items. It is essential to everyday life in Soviet society.  
Although blat was an important phenomenon in everyday Soviet life, it was not 
widely acknowledged. Many people who had lived in the Soviet Union were reluctant to 
talk about blat or to acknowledge their own use of it. The Harvard refugee interview 
project, which surveyed over 700 refugees from the USSR in the early 1950s, reveals a 
great deal about the discomfort associated with blat. Respondents in the interviews 
typically distanced themselves from blat as much as possible. Those who did talk about 
blat emphasized the human element of blat relations, describing the practice as a way that 
friends helped one another (Russian Research Center, 1950). Thus, although the concept 
of mutual assistance that is so integral to blat made it more acceptable to some, the 
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phenomenon was still considered something that others did, and that was best not to 
admit to oneself. 
However, the Harvard project’s respondents also pointed out that some people 
were much more involved in blat practices than ordinary citizens. These blat 
professionals had contacts with higher persons and knew the Soviet system well enough 
to manipulate it. Blat professionals knew whom to approach in order to obtain a specific 
good or get a particular need taken care of. Blat experts cultivated relationships with and 
had access to many more contacts than the average Soviet citizen, and were able to use 
blat to a much greater extent and much more effectively (Fitzpatrick, 1999). 
The Soviet film “Ty – mne, ya – tebe” provides a comedic depiction of the blat 
professional in Soviet society (Seryi, 1976). The protagonist, Ivan Kashkin, is the 
ultimate blat professional – although he has a job as a bath attendant, his real work is in 
the establishment and use of connections to obtain sought-after goods. Kashkin 
exchanges gifts with his clients at work, owns various foreign records and other luxury 
items, and is able to skip long lines simply by mentioning the name of an important 
official with whom he has a connection. In short, Kashkin lives by the reciprocal 
principle of “ty – mne, ya – tebe” (“you to me and I to you” or “you scratch my back, I’ll 
scratch yours”), which allows him to live a remarkably comfortable and luxurious life.  
In the post-war period, blat merged further with the Soviet system. Ledeneva 
attributes this to the appearance of tolkachi (1998). The word tolkach, which literally 
translates as pusher, refers to people who were charged with expediting the production of 
goods in Soviet factories. The tolkachi were responsible for ensuring that production 
targets were achieved. In order to meet the necessary quotas, tolkachi had to obtain 
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materials through a variety of networks, using their connections to procure goods that 
would otherwise be hard to find. These practices, which were technically in violation of 
the Soviet system’s rules, actually became more transparent and were accepted as part of 
the institution of Soviet production. Indeed, production quotas would have been almost 
impossible to fill without the use of connections, so in many ways, the Soviet system 
actually encouraged blat practices. 
Blat became even more prevalent and tolerated during the Brezhnev era, when it 
became a more widespread method of obtaining goods that were in short supply 
(Ledeneva, 1998). The growth in the use of blat can be attributed to several factors. One 
reason for the growing use of blat was that consumer demands for specific goods were 
changing and growing, and the inefficient planned economy was unable to compensate 
for the higher levels of demand. Because of this, people turned more frequently to the 
shadow economy to obtain necessary goods and services. A second reason for increased 
use of blat is that citizens simply believed less and less in Soviet ideology, and were 
more inclined to circumvent official channels. Thirdly, authorities became more willing 
to turn a blind eye on blat practices, because they had actually become instrumental in 
ensuring that the command economy could function (Ivanova, 2011).  
Satirical works during the Brezhnev era, as before, played on the use of 
connections to gain access to goods. In one poem, which appeared in Krokodil, the 
protagonist attempts to buy cigarettes, only to find that the door to the store is locked. A 
woman inside yells at him that the salesman is busy distributing shortage goods (defitsit) 
to his friends. The salesman, meanwhile, protects the defitsit with his body and cries that 
he is doing “a responsible deed.” The narrator concludes that he is better off, as he no 
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longer goes to the store and has quit smoking. But, he says, his neighbor is not so lucky – 
he has quit eating (Poluian, 1976). This poem demonstrates the combination of shame 
and defiance related to using blat. It also highlights the winners and losers of blat 
transactions – while the salesman’s friends are benefitting, the protagonist, and especially 
his neighbor, are unable to buy necessary goods that are in shortage. 
The government, for its part, did little to slow the growth in activity in the shadow 
economy. Blat transactions during this period were tolerated, or even “winked at” by the 
regime, in what James Millar refers to as the “Little Deal” (1985). The Little Deal was 
essentially a tacit agreement between the authorities and the population that allowed the 
second economy to flourish. Under the Little Deal, Soviet citizens were able to gain 
access to various goods and services without any real threat of punishment by the regime. 
Whereas large-scale transactions of this sort were clearly illegal and could result in 
significant consequences, petty exchanges within circles of personal connections were 
mostly ignored. This is most likely because blat actually eased many of the problems 
associated with shortage, and the government had an interest in letting the system of 
connections continue to operate (O’Hearn, 1980). Thus, blat was used to obtain such 
diverse goods and services as cold cuts and other delicacies, hairdressing, tutoring, 
medical services, and housekeeping. During this time, blat connections were used 
extensively and obviously, suggesting that there was no real punishment for such 
infractions.  
 
17 
 
Characteristics of blat networks 
Given that blat is a phenomenon that relies on connections, it is important to 
understand the networks that allow it to operate. Blat networks can be broken down into 
two main categories: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal networks are those that are made 
up of people of similar status, while vertical networks are composed of people of 
different social strata interested in each other’s connections (Ledeneva, 1998). Imagine a 
horizontal network as a group of friends or family members that are all of roughly 
equivalent socioeconomic status. Exchanges between members of such a network are a 
regular occurrence, and there is no appearance of impropriety. Most people would agree 
that it is acceptable, if not encouraged, for friends and family members to share items 
with each other or perform tasks for each other in an ongoing exchange. This sort of 
horizontal reciprocity is seen in almost all societies. However, it was much more 
pronounced in the Soviet Union because it was one of the only methods of procuring 
necessary goods and services.  
Vertical networks, meanwhile, were used much less frequently. An example of a 
vertical network would include a worker, or someone on a lower social stratum, and a 
party boss, who has access to various goods and services that others do not. The 
connection between these two actors becomes essential to the worker, and the party boss 
may provide him with various favors that others do not have access to. All of these favors 
are given, however, with the expectation of an exchange, and the worker will eventually 
need to reciprocate by helping the party boss in whatever way he can. It is the use of 
these vertical networks, rather than horizontal ones, that accounts for much of the 
negative association with blat. The main difference between these two types of blat 
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relations is that while horizontal networks were used on a regular basis, vertical networks 
were used less often. Furthermore, blat ties among family and friends (horizontal) were 
more commonly accepted, whereas the use of connections for profit or explicit exchange 
(vertical) was often looked upon with resentment, because they were seen as unethical 
and less personal than horizontal exchanges. 
It should be noted that, although similar in many respects, blat is not the same 
thing as bribery. While the two phenomena certainly overlap, blat differs from bribery in 
the sense that there is always a personal basis for the exchange. Bribery also implies 
immediate payment, whereas reciprocation in a blat transaction can take time and occur 
in various forms (Berliner, 1957). The line, however, between bribery and blat, can 
sometimes be difficult to make out. One case that demonstrates the ambiguity of the 
distinction is that of Yuri Sokolov, the director of the Eliseevsky Gastronom in Moscow 
(Faitelberg, 2004). 
During the Brezhnev period, the Eliseevsky Gastronom was known as the best 
grocery store for buying items that were almost impossible to find elsewhere. Because of 
this, many members of high society, including diplomats, generals, and actors, attempted 
to cultivate a relationship with the director of the store, Yuri Sokolov. In exchange for 
access to the store’s shortage items, these high-powered people were able to offer 
Sokolov various services. For example, Sokolov’s friendship with the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Nikolai Shchelokov, allowed him to avoid problems with law enforcement. The 
actors, artists, and musicians, meanwhile, gave Sokolov access to tickets for various 
shows, and even performed an annual concert at the store itself. These were all classic 
examples of blat exchanges – continuous interactions based on friendship. 
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However, in order to obtain those coveted goods that made his store so attractive, 
Sokolov needed money. Therefore, in addition to various favors, Sokolov also took 
bribes, which he then passed on to members of the Gortorg, which determined the 
allocation of goods for grocery stores. By bribing these officials, Sokolov was able to 
guarantee access to luxury grocery items, and therefore able to hold up his end of the 
relationships he had cultivated with Moscow high society. In the case of the Eliseevsky 
Gastronom, blat and bribery were intimately interconnected.  
Despite the hazy distinction between blat and bribery that can appear in practice, 
however, the two phenomena can be distinguished from one another in theory. Blat 
consists of multiple favors given over time within personal networks; a bribe, by contrast, 
is a specific, immediate deal outside of those networks (Humphrey, 2002). Thus, this 
paper is not simply an investigation of bribery or corruption, but of a specific cultural 
phenomenon that occurs based on personal relationships. 
These personal relationships were fundamental to the day-to-day working of 
Soviet society. They created a sort of social capital, a currency in which practically 
everyone had something they could share with others, with the expectation of eventual 
reciprocation (Utekhin, 2007). Although blat went against the Soviet social and economic 
order, the system could not have functioned without it. Blat became the primary way of 
getting things done in a non-market society in which money had little value. The 
relationship between the Soviet system and blat had two sides to it. On the one hand, the 
conditions created by a command economy made blat necessary and allowed it to 
operate. On the other hand, the structure of the system and the rules enforced by Soviet 
authorities limited blat practices to small-scale transactions, and kept the entire 
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phenomenon of blat from spiraling out of control. Once the Soviet system disappeared, 
however, the nature of blat changed dramatically.  
 21 
II. Blat and the transition to a market economy 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as Russia was transformed from a command 
economy into a market economy, blat played a crucial role in the way the business 
environment developed. For many entrepreneurs during this period, one’s connections 
were the main determinant of whether or not one was to succeed in business. The use of 
blat during the transition to a market economy created a small group of insiders that 
succeeded in business, while the vast majority of those who lacked connections were less 
successful. A brief history of the process of privatization and the transition to a capitalist 
economy will explain how blat contributed to the creation of an insider/outsider dynamic 
– a dynamic that still exists in the Russian market today. 
Beginning in 1987, as part of Gorbachev’s attempt to reform the Soviet system, 
the state allowed new autonomous businesses, known as “cooperatives,” to form. The 
cooperative movement was initially limited to small sections of the economy, but by the 
time the Law on Cooperatives was adopted in 1988, many of these quasi-private 
businesses had already formed. As the movement took hold, it became clear that success 
depended on knowing the right people. Connections were important in establishing a 
cooperative for several reasons. First, one could not simply start a cooperative; it was 
necessary to obtain permission from the government. Not surprisingly, many of those 
who received permission to start cooperatives in the early years were already well 
connected with those in power.  
Second, many goods remained difficult to find during the transition, and 
connections were essential for obtaining the necessary supplies to operate a business. 
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Despite the fact that cooperatives represented a significant step away from the planned 
economy, they were still operating in an environment of scarcity. Thus, only those who 
had connections to suppliers could truly benefit from the opportunities of the cooperative 
movement. As journalist David E. Hoffman points out in his book on the transition, “the 
first private entrepreneurs had to rely on their wits—on blat and svyazi, on theft, bribes 
and bargaining—to get supplies” (2002, p. 42). 
Third, ties to the government allowed many cooperatives to acquire the necessary 
liquidity to develop their business, especially as many cooperatives attempted to enter the 
banking industry. This is because most banks would have been unable to survive without 
cheap credit from the state. Indeed, “big industries, regional governments, and the 
Communist Party and its many affiliates were the driving force in the explosion of the 
new banking sector, and their political clout and money dwarfed the more independent 
young cooperatives” (Hoffman, 2002, p. 46). Thus, those entrepreneurs who had 
connections to state resources were much better positioned to establish successful, 
lucrative banking operations. 
One of those who benefitted hugely from this system was Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
a young Komsomol member who went on to become the richest man in Russia. Over a 
very short period of time, Khodorkovsky was able to make huge amounts of money 
through various business operations, eventually establishing Bank Menatep and acquiring 
the oil company Yukos. His success was in large part thanks to his various connections 
and friendships, and to his affiliation with the Komsomol, which provided him with 
legitimacy and access (Hoffman, 2002). As Khodorkovsky himself acknowledged, “All 
the ventures that were started at this time succeeded only if they were sponsored by or 
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had strong connections with high-ranking people. It wasn’t the money but the patronage. 
At the time, you had to have political sponsorship” (Khodorkovsky qtd. in Hoffman, 
2002, p. 101). And Khodorkovsky was not alone. In fact, his is just one example of “a 
movement that would gain momentum as the Soviet Union fell apart: party, government, 
militia, and KGB officials on all levels went into business, using their contacts as starting 
capital” (Brady, 1999, p. 56). In many cases, these contacts were the determinant of 
success. 
Another entrepreneur who took advantage of his connections in order to succeed 
in business was Vladimir Gusinsky, the former media magnate. Like Khodorkovsky, 
Gusinsky recognized the importance of friendships and connections with people in high 
places. Regardless of one’s personal feelings toward a particular official, it was essential 
to develop good relations with anyone who could be of use. Even more important, 
Gusinsky believed, was to offer that official something that he needed to advance his own 
career: “So it was always important for me to understand, what does this boss need?” 
(Gusinsky qtd. in Hoffman, 2002, p. 160). Gusinsky’s observations demonstrate how blat 
had become a system that allowed officials and businessmen to pursue their own self-
interest under a veneer of friendly relations. 
Blat also proved instrumental in determining who would control those businesses 
that already existed prior to the collapse. In many cases, those who already knew the ins 
and outs of the business and had established connections in the industry were able to 
retain control in the face of market reforms. Newcomers, even with an education in 
business and free markets, were at a disadvantage. This was particularly apparent in the 
battle for the position of general director of the Vladimir Tractor Factory. The Factory, 
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which was the main employer in the town of Vladimir, had made tractors and diesel 
engines since 1945. In the face of Yeltsin’s reforms, the question emerged of who would 
take control of the factory when the state sold its shares. 
On one side was the factory’s general director, Anatoly Grishin. Grishin was well 
versed in the central planning system, and knew how to succeed within it. He had 
mastered the art of using personal ties and “managing within the old boys’ network” 
(Brady, 1999, p. 82). He had close relationships with customers as well as suppliers, and 
also maintained contacts within government. However, Grishin was challenged for 
ownership by Josef Bakaleynik, the deputy director of the factory. Bakaleynik was the 
quintessential new Russian businessman with a passion for markets, having even studied 
at Harvard Business School through a scholarship program for Soviet managers. 
In order to gain control of the factory, one of the men would have to gain control 
of the shares, which meant winning over the shareholders, mainly factory workers. 
Bakaleynik attempted to do this by offering the shareholders a dividend, but Grishin was 
able to gain far more support by having his foremen ask workers to hand over their voting 
rights to worker representatives (Brady, 1999). At the shareholders meeting, Bakaleynik 
attempted to appeal to market values and the new business environment, but received 
little support. One worker declared, “I think a Harvard education will not help you. 
Today you need personal contacts, deep personal contacts” (Brady, 1999, p. 89). Another 
worker expressed his confidence in Grishin based on the length of their relationship, 
declaring, “I trust him because I know him for eighteen years” (Brady, 1999, p. 91). The 
reactions of the workers demonstrated that even in the transition, business knowledge 
was secondary to connections. This was made clear in the voting as well, which Grishin 
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won by a whopping 82 percent. When it came to knowing the right people, Grishin 
clearly came out ahead, and was thus able to retain control of the factory through the 
reforms. 
As the transition from the command economy to the market economy moved 
forward, connections with those in power continued to be an important determinant of 
who succeeded in Russian business. As part of the effort to privatize state-owned assets, 
the state held so-called “loans-for-shares” auctions. These auctions, which were part of 
the post-voucher “cash phase” of privatization, were intended to help the government 
finance the federal budget deficit. Under the program, the government offered shares in 
major companies as collateral for loans from large banks. Given the government's 
deplorable financial situation, the program practically guaranteed the banks a stake in the 
companies in question. The ability to participate in the program was therefore crucial, as 
it was a stepping stone to ownership in large state companies. However, participation in 
the loans-for-shares auctions was limited to a small number of banks. The new owners of 
the former state companies were selected not by market forces, but by politicians 
(Hoffman, 2002). Indeed, all the banks that were allowed to participate in the auctions 
had close ties to political power brokers (Colloudon, 1998). Thus, it was important to 
have friends in high places, and to use those connections for a chance to participate in the 
loans-for-shares auctions.  
One case in which connections to the government proved particularly lucrative 
was in the auction for Norilsk Nickel in 1995. In November of that year, an auction was 
held for control of 38% of Norilsk Nickel, which was the world's largest producer of 
nickel, platinum, and cobalt. Uneximbank, the firm that was ultimately victorious in the 
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auction, had close ties to President Yeltsin's former security chief and drinking buddy, 
Alexander Karzhakov. This connection gave the firm a distinct advantage, especially 
since Uneximbank itself was charged with managing the auction. In this role, 
Uneximbank was able to award itself control of Norilsk Nickel at a laughably low price – 
only half that offered by a competitor. Furthermore, with a price tag of $170 million, the 
shares of Norilsk Nickel were sold at only $100,000 above the minimum bid level, 
which, not surprisingly, was set by Uneximbank (Frydman et al, 1998). Thus, 
Uneximbank was able to capitalize on its connections within the government to gain the 
position of auctioneer, thereby ensuring that the firm would be able to buy the shares of 
Norilsk Nickel at a cut-rate price. 
The importance of connections in establishing a cooperative or participating in the 
loans-for-shares auctions ensured that only a small group of people would significantly 
profit from the process of privatization. As a result of the reforms of this period, a close-
knit, clannish economic elite formed in Russia. By the the mid-1990s, it had become 
clear that privatization in Russia was not the domain of self-made entrepreneurs, but 
instead of the politically and economically well-connected (Karklins, 2005). Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya, a Russian sociologist, was one of the first to take note of and study the 
emerging clan structure of what she called “the financial oligarchy” (qtd. in Hoffman, 
2002). The group she observed, generally referred to simply as “the oligarchs”, formed a 
network of connections that married the interests of wealth and power. Glenn Waller, an 
Australian diplomat who was in Russia at the time, called the relationship between 
business and government “incestuous”, claiming that even the new business elite was a 
product of the old Soviet system:  
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Most (if not all) of the private financial groups made their first capital through 
their privileged access to party and Komsomol funds or through political contacts 
(in Russian: blat) in government ministries. Today, they continue to rely on 
government favors…. Big Business in Russia continues to coalesce around 
powerful political leaders. (Waller qtd. in Hoffman, 2002, p. 322) 
As Waller notes, the blat connections between political leaders and businesspeople in 
Russia determined who was part of the elite group of oligarchs, and thus, who succeeded 
in business. Indeed, “each oligarch needed to cultivate a good relationship with a senior 
government official or his relatives. Intrigue, connections and payoffs count for more 
than talent” (Goldman, 2003, p. 154). Without such connections, a newcomer to Russain 
business would be at a severe disadvantage. This dynamic of insiders and outsiders would 
continue to determine the course of the Russian economy for years after the end of 
privatization. 
It is clear that blat played a significant role in the formation of the Russian market 
economy in the post-Soviet era. It is true that blat was in many ways a tool for coping 
with the rigidities of the Soviet command economy. However, it appears that the 
phenomenon was so “deeply embedded in social relations, including kinship, 
neighborhood, ethnicity, and common religion,” that it continued to shape market 
interactions throughout the post-Soviet transition (Humphrey, 2002, p. 138). This is not 
to say that the nature of blat did not change during this time period – it was certainly 
adapted and molded to fit the needs of the new economy and the new actors on the post-
Soviet stage. However, the essence of the phenomenon remained the same: the use of 
personal connections to obtain hard-to-find goods and services. 
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III. Blat lived, lives, and will live: The use of connections in modern Russia 
The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of many of the conditions that 
made blat necessary, and the process of transition to a market economy certainly 
transformed the phenomenon. But does this mean that blat has disappeared entirely? Or 
has it simply evolved in the context of the post-Soviet economy? 
The word “blat” itself is still in use, although a generational gap seems to have 
developed in terms of its understanding. Whereas older generations associate the term 
“blat” with the use of connections, younger generations associate it more with its 
original, pre-Soviet meaning, which refers to petty criminal activity. Although this 
generational difference indicates that the term has lost its central significance, it does not 
mean that blat no longer exists. Indeed, Ledeneva argues that blat has assumed new 
forms that go beyond the areas in which the term was traditionally used (1998). Thus, 
although blat has changed, and may no longer be consistently referred to by the same 
name, it should be analyzed as a continuous – though evolving – phenomenon. 
In her most recent analysis of blat in the post-Soviet environment, Ledeneva 
explains the changes that the phenomenon has undergone in the past two decades. First, 
blat has become monetized. This is because, in general, goods are now widely available. 
Money, on the other hand, is in short supply. Whereas blat was once a means of 
obtaining goods and services in a society in which money had little value, it is now used 
to obtain the money itself (Ledeneva, 1998). The driving force behind blat connections 
has therefore been reoriented toward obtaining money. The scale of blat exchange has 
also changed. Blat is now used for a wider variety of needs in the newly formed private 
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sector, such as establishing a personal business or rerouting state funds into the private 
sector. However, the number of people to whom blat is available as a means of 
transaction has shrunk. Blat in the Soviet system was available to virtually everyone as a 
method of obtaining necessary goods. Now, however, blat is only available to a select 
few in the business sphere. Therefore, blat practices are larger in scale, but less pervasive, 
primarily serving the needs of the business sector (Ledeneva, 2008). 
Given the new importance of blat in the business sector, this area deserves special 
attention. The use of blat is often cited as one of the reasons for the corruption that 
continues to afflict Russian business. In business, blat is used to access bureaucratic 
decision-making and information, connections that can in turn result in increased 
monetary income. In fact, many now consider business to be one of the realms in which 
blat remains most useful today (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). Part of the continued use of 
blat can be explained by history – the use of personal connections has become deeply 
embedded in Russian culture. However, there is also a practical explanation for the 
phenomenon’s continued importance. The Russian business environment is characterized 
by an inadequate legal system that fails to guarantee businesses protection through any 
formal needs. Therefore, the formation of close personal relationships and informal 
networks is used to replace the formal protections that are present in more developed 
business environments (Butler & Purchase, 2004; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). As in 
Soviet times, blat serves as grease for a machine that might not otherwise function, 
supplementing for the system’s deficiencies and failures.  
As a response to these shortcomings, businesspeople in Russia have resorted to a 
particular form of blat adapted for the market economy. Like in Soviet blat networks, the 
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connections in Russian business are based on personal contacts in what is referred to as 
“network capitalism” (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007; Hunter, 2003). Despite its impersonal 
name, network capitalism is a system in which “virtually all important business alliances 
are embedded in personal ties between business people who know and trust one another” 
(Hunter, 2003, p. 115). Thus, network capitalism is simply a different name for a more 
modern manifestation of blat – one that has adapted to the needs of Russian 
businesspeople in the market economy. 
The use of network capitalism as a business tool is widespread in post-Soviet 
Russia. In a survey conducted in the late 1990s, Russian managers ranked connections as 
one of the two most important factors for success in business1 (Taylor & Kazakov, 1997). 
In another study of twenty-two Russian domestic firms, fifteen firms attested to using 
connections to do business, and nine of those firms specifically used the term blat to 
describe their business practices (Hunter, 2003). Furthermore, network capitalism has 
been shown to be an effective tool for those firms and businesspeople who use it. In a 
study based on interviews with seventy-five Russian entrepreneurs, political scientist Bat 
Batjargal (2003) found that personal network ties directly improve entrepreneurial 
performance. This is because, according to Batjargal, “having many weak ties and being 
able to mobilize financial resources from rich and powerful contacts enables 
entrepreneurs to increase their revenues and profits” (p. 551). Network capitalism, then, 
is both a widely used and effective tool in Russian business. 
For businesses in contemporary Russia, network capitalism, or blat, is especially 
necessary in relation to tax authorities, customs officers, the banking sector, and regional 
                                                 
1 The other most important factor that the surveyed managers listed was dishonesty. 
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administration (Michailova & Worm, 2003). Blat is a helpful tool for businesses looking 
to gain preferential bank financing, export licenses, tax exemptions, special terms in 
contracts, or access to influential customers (Butler & Purchase, 2004; Ledeneva, 2008). 
In order to establish a business and keep it running, “entrepreneurs must routinely offer 
favors to public officials, ranging from local police and fire authorities to politicians in 
local and federal governments” (Puffer et al., 2010, p. 448). Interestingly, the use of blat 
connections both substitutes and complements the use of money when dealing with 
officials. Connections allow certain businesspeople within a network to obtain a good or 
service for which others would have to pay a bribe, or at least reduces the amount of the 
bribe that is required (Gehlbach, 2001). 
As in the Soviet era, the use of blat is reflected in contemporary literature. In 
Oksana Robski’s novel Casual, the main character is attempting to start a buttermilk 
business. The protagonist explains the plight of looking for someone to sell her product: 
“Now I had to find a network of dealers. If I talked to Wimm-Bill-Dann, the biggest 
packagers of juices in Russia, they would start selling buttermilk themselves. I had to talk 
to a friend, who would be bound by his word” (Robski, 2006, p. 63). The importance of 
obligation in blat connections is key here. The narrator feels that she cannot trust anyone 
with whom she would communicate through official channels, and therefore seeks out 
someone on whom she can rely on a personal basis, and who feels compelled to help her. 
The connections that businesspeople like Robski’s character use can be long-
standing, but some blat connections have been formed more recently. The success of the 
new economic elite “is often built on networks of access to goods, information and 
contacts either dating back to their professional position in Soviet times or due to their 
32 
 
‘family background’” (Bruno, 1997, p. 57). Indeed, connections formed under the Soviet 
system remain prevalent in modern Russian business. However, newly founded 
enterprises are building new networks of their own (Huber & Wörgötter, 1998). Thus, it 
would seem that the use of blat in business is not simply a holdover from the command 
economy, but a phenomenon that is continuing to perpetuate itself in market conditions as 
well. 
Although blat has continued to be a useful business tool for those who are part of 
a network, it disadvantages those who are outside of the web of connections. As pointed 
out earlier, blat connections reduce the costs of dealing with officials by substituting for, 
or at least complementing bribery. However, those entrepreneurs outside the network 
face higher costs than they would in the absence of a network, because without 
connections, they are forced to pay the full bribe (Gehlbach, 2001). Thus, blat networks 
decrease costs for members of the in-group, who are able to circumvent the need to pay 
bribes. Those same networks, on the other hand, increase costs for those who are 
outsiders, and must pay for necessary favors from officials. 
This theory of blat networks is corroborated by evidence indicating that the 
Russian business environment favors insiders. In an analysis of Russian entrepreneurship, 
Aidis et al. (2008) found that entrepreneurs who are already in the business sector 
dominate entrepreneurial entry in Russia more than in other countries. The entrepreneurs’ 
connections in the business sector were most likely key in creating this advantage, and in 
discouraging entry of new business actors. Thus, network capitalism, or business blat, is 
a system that favors insiders, with little opportunity for entry by newcomers to the 
business sector. 
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IV. Strangers in a Strange Land: How blat affects foreign businesspeople 
It is widely agreed that Russia is not an easy market for foreign companies to 
enter. Indeed, Russia places 120th out of 183 countries on the World Bank’s ease of doing 
business rankings, receiving a worse rating than countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, and 
Kosovo (World Bank, 2012). It is also no secret that corruption in the country is rampant, 
and Russia ranks 143rd out of 182 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011). Given that international 
perceptions of the Russian business environment are so poor, it is not surprising that 
levels of Foreign Direct Investment in the country have remained relatively low. In the 
period from 1992 to 2010, the average foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP 
was only 1.7%. China’s, meanwhile, was over 4% (World Bank, 2011). While it is 
impossible to determine to what extent, blat and similar practices undoubtedly contribute 
significantly to these abysmally low rankings and investment figures. As already 
discussed, blat is still a very important reality of the business environment in Russia. But 
what specific effect does the phenomenon have on foreign companies trying to do 
business in Russia? Do foreigners encounter blat in their dealings with Russians, and if 
so, how does it affect their own business success? 
Given that Russia has only been a part of the global marketplace for about twenty 
years, it can be difficult to draw lasting conclusions about the various difficulties and 
advantages of foreign investment in the country. This is especially true with respect to the 
challenges posed to a foreign investor by blat, since the phenomenon itself is not well 
documented. However, by piecing together various observations made over the past 
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twenty years regarding foreign companies doing business in Russia, we can better 
understand the nature of blat’s effects on foreign investors. 
The first question that arises with respect to blat and foreign companies is 
whether the phenomenon is relevant to non-Russian businesses at all. Blat is, after all, a 
uniquely Soviet (and now Russian) concept, and it seems to only occur within established 
networks. However, blat networks do not exist in a vacuum. In fact, foreign companies 
will often encounter blat networks, and many times have no choice but to deal with them. 
In their overview of the differences in business ethics between Russians and Americans, 
Sheila Puffer and Daniel McCarthy note that American businesspeople are likely to 
encounter blat quite often in Russia. In fact, they claim blat is “the most frequently 
encountered questionable behavior in Russia” (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995). Thus, blat is 
not just a nebulous, outdated Soviet concept, but a modern reality that foreign 
businesspeople continue to encounter. But the question remains: how exactly does blat 
affect the experiences of foreign companies in the Russian market? 
In some cases, when used effectively, blat practices can actually provide foreign 
firms with certain advantages when entering the Russian market. Indeed, networking 
capabilities and the use of connections have played a major role in determining foreign 
firms’ effectiveness. A survey of 179 foreign firms operating in Russia, for example, 
found that adaptability to network conditions and involvement within networks were the 
most important determinants of effectiveness in the Russian market (Fey & Denison, 
2003). Another study of West European companies investing in Russia found that it was 
very important to have a partner with political influence, especially in the context of 
Russia’s fluid legal environment. Having such a partner was particularly helpful for 
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obtaining approval to set up a new office, or in registration, custodial, and settlement 
procedures (Ariño et al., 1997). It is clear then, that adapting to networks and using 
connections to one’s advantage can help foreign firms in their entry into the Russian 
market. However, the blat system has many drawbacks for foreign entrants as well – 
hindrances that often outweigh the advantage that the system can provide.  
One way in which blat has proven difficult for foreigners is that it is simply very 
different from business practices in other countries. With the possible exception of 
Chinese guanxi2, there are no real analogues to blat in other cultures. Although it may be 
tempting to compare blat to the networking that is often used in the West, the two 
phenomena are actually quite different. Personal networking in the West is based 
primarily on individualism and is characterized by non-personal exchanges that are 
discrete in time and take place outside the workplace. Blat, on the other hand, is based on 
collectivism, and is characterized by highly frequent exchanges that are usually personal, 
but also take place at the workplace (Michailova & Worm, 2003). Because of these 
differences, Western businesspeople will not be predisposed to understanding how blat 
networks function.  
Foreign investors are likely to have a difficult time navigating the peculiarities of 
a business environment in which an unfamiliar concept plays such a large role. Scholars 
have cited a noticeable variance between Russian national business culture and 
international business culture as a challenge and deterrent to foreign firms doing business 
                                                 
2 Guanxi involves “the exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships and 
networks of mutual dependence; and the creation of obligation and indebtedness” (Ledeneva, 2008). The 
many differences between blat and guanxi are not within the purview of this paper, but it is important to 
recognize that, although the two phenomena are often compared, they are not the same. 
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in Russia (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 2005). Undoubtedly, blat plays a role in this 
variance, widening the gap in business practices between Russia and the rest of the world. 
Specifically, foreign investors may encounter blurred boundaries between formal 
and informal spheres when engaging in business. This stands in sharp contrast to 
practices in the West, where business relationships are generally impersonal, and 
business interactions take place in a formal setting (Jansson et al., 2007). This difference 
can often be a source of confusion for Western investors in Russia. The importance of the 
personal dimension of Russian business relationships means that foreign investors may 
need to spend a good deal of time on relationships with Russian business partners. Often 
this means getting to know each other’s families, drinking vodka, or going on hunting 
trips. This, of course, would be unfamiliar territory for Western businesspeople, who are 
accustomed to formal negotiations and straightforward agreements (Brady, 1999). 
Indeed, Westerners often underestimate the amount of time and effort necessary to build 
a relationship and secure an initial agreement with a Russian business partner (Barnes et 
al., 1997). 
A second obstacle that foreigners will likely encounter is that blat is, by its very 
nature, an exclusive arrangement. No matter how hard a foreign businessperson tries to 
understand and engage in blat, the system will favor insiders. We have already discussed 
how, during the transition from a command economy to a market economy, blat 
connections created a clear dichotomy between insiders and outsiders. Those with ties to 
government and friends in high places were much better positioned to succeed in the new 
Russia than those who were less well connected. Connections to people in power were 
then, and remain now, an essential part of doing business in Russia.  
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Because of the strong ties between businesses and the state, the Russian economy 
still provides greater opportunities to so-called “entrepreneurial insiders” than to less 
connected newcomers to the market (Aidis, 2007). Furthermore, connections continue to 
play an important role long after a business is established. This is partially to facilitate the 
process of getting supplies or finding customers. But it is also indicative of a larger 
cultural mistrust of outsiders, which leads to a lack of transparency and a dependency on 
networks (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011). It is not difficult to see then, how a system that so 
favors insiders would be especially difficult for a foreign investor to navigate. Indeed, 
Russian networks “are closed and opaque to outsider firms” (Jansson et al., 2007). A 
foreign businessperson will be unlikely to know the necessary authorities in Russian 
government, and even less likely to be able to trust them to the extent a well-connected 
Russian businessperson could. Foreign businesspeople, as outsiders, are thus limited in 
their ability to participate in the system of exchange and blat relations (Bruno, 1997). 
Language and cultural barriers aside, the system of blat is a closed-off one, and even the 
most well-financed, talented foreign businesspeople will have difficulty penetrating it. 
But there is a third problem associated with blat, one that foreigners are unlikely 
to overcome, even with considerable time and effort. Specifically, foreign firms will face 
the challenge of operating under international ethical standards, which often don’t 
correspond with Russian business practices. Blat itself is not technically illegal. But blat 
networks are often used for questionable practices from which many foreign companies 
would shrink. Since blat often involves using connections with state authorities to benefit 
one’s business, it can easily run afoul of foreigners’ concept of ethical business practices 
(Puffer and McCarthy, 1995). Indeed, practices that are legal in Russia may still cause 
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problems for foreign companies because they face legal sanctions from their home 
country.3 This can discourage multinationals from engaging in any practice that could be 
seen as corruptive, since they risk facing significant legal consequences at home (Venard, 
2009). Even setting these legal issues aside, most foreign companies are held to account 
by consumers in countries with a different understanding of business ethics than that 
found in Russia. What may be looked upon as an everyday business practice in Russia 
could be seen as bribery by observers abroad. Therefore, foreign companies are put in the 
awkward position of trying to integrate themselves into a system of practices that would 
not necessarily be considered ethical by their consumers.  
In sum, I propose that blat disadvantages foreign businesses in Russia in three 
distinct ways. (1) It is unique to Russian culture and difficult for non-Russian 
businesspeople to understand. Because there is no analogue to blat in other countries’ 
business cultures, foreign businesspeople have difficulty learning how to navigate the 
system. (2) Blat is, by nature, a system that favors insiders. Having longstanding 
connections with the right people is key, and foreign companies, as the ultimate outsiders, 
are at a significant disadvantage. (3) The practices associated with blat are sometimes of 
questionable ethical nature to outside observers, and even foreign firms that are able to 
integrate themselves effectively into the Russian market may face pressure from 
consumers or legal sanctions from their own governments for engaging in blat practices.  
 
                                                 
3 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example, prohibits the bribery of foreign government officials by 
U.S. persons. (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998) 
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The case of IKEA 
In order to assess this theory of how blat affects multinational companies 
operating in Russia, it is useful to examine the experience of the Swedish furniture 
retailer IKEA in entering the Russian market. I have chosen IKEA because it is one of the 
few Western multinationals whose experiences in Russia have been well documented. 
Thus, using this company’s experience as a qualitative case study gives us the most 
information with which to test the hypothesis above about blat’s effect on foreign firms. 
IKEA opened its first Russian store in Moscow in 2000, and now has fourteen 
stores in eleven Russian cities (“Richer Russians,” 2012). Russia quickly became a very 
important market for the company, accounting for 5 percent of their business worldwide. 
Prior to the economic crisis, IKEA’s business in Russia was growing 20 percent per year 
(Kramer, 2009b). The company has repeatedly cited Russia as a key market, with 
significant business potential in retailing, purchasing, and production (IKEA Group, 
2010). However, the company has also encountered various obstacles in Russia. This 
section will explore the business practices that allowed IKEA to succeed in Russia, the 
difficulties that have plagued the company more recently, and the role of blat practices in 
determining the nature of the company’s experience in the Russian market. 
One reason that IKEA was able to achieve relatively rapid growth and success in 
Russia was its effective use of connections when initially entering the market. As with 
many firms, blat seems to have helped IKEA deal with the challenges of the Russian 
market. In their study of IKEA’s entry into the Russian market, Elg, Ghauri, and 
Tarnovskaya (2008) found that the company was successful because of its use of network 
capitalism and its cultivation of close personal relationships with key people. IKEA made 
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a concerted effort to build trust with network insiders. By building this trust and 
becoming part of the network, IKEA became less of an outsider. Indeed, building trust 
with network insiders was critical, as it facilitated “the growth of the network and the 
development of business contacts to those network actors who are in control of critical 
activities and resources” (Elg et al., 2008, p. 689). As the trust between IKEA staff and 
their Russian contacts grew, both parties became more open in sharing information. 
IKEA, then, was itself able to become somewhat of an insider, which in turn gave it a 
competitive advantage in relation to other retailers, who had not cultivated the same type 
of personal relationships.  
Networking activities were critical because contacts with officials aided IKEA in 
acquiring necessary permissions and land or managing construction of their large store 
complexes. IKEA made an effort to establish personal contacts with authorities at all 
levels of government, as well as with suppliers, journalists, and other influential actors. 
IKEA’s initial success was facilitated by the fact that the company worked on 
establishing supplier relationships well in advance of opening stores in the country. A 
close personal rapport with key Russian actors was essential. Even the highest levels of 
management and government were involved: IKEA’s founder, Ingvar Kamprad, met 
personally with President Putin to discuss Russian customs rules and IKEA’s plans for 
future investment (Elg et al., 2008).  
These relationships ensured that IKEA would have an established business 
network in Russia. They also helped provide IKEA with a preliminary understanding of 
the culture and the consumers it would be dealing with. In general, “the exchange of 
mutual benefits and relationships with political and social actors also gave IKEA 
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representatives an increasing understanding of the culture as well as of how the 
bureaucratic system worked” (Elg et al., 2008, p. 690). Thus, the connections that IKEA 
made early on in the establishment of its Russian venture helped make the company more 
fluent in the language of blat, giving its executives a better understanding of how Russian 
networks functioned. It also guaranteed that the company had friends in powerful 
positions. These relationships, both by teaching IKEA managers about blat and by 
providing the benefits associated with network capitalism, proved instrumental in 
ensuring that IKEA’s entry into the Russian market was a success. 
IKEA also brought its own creative business approach to its operations in Russia, 
which helped the company overcome some of the problems it encountered. Although 
IKEA had made a concerted effort to cultivate good relationships and blat connections 
with Russian officials, it also wanted to ensure that it would not be completely dependent 
on them. This often meant resorting to new and creative methods of ensuring the 
company’s independence and ability to operate. For example, when officials cut off the 
electricity supply prior to the opening of one of IKEA’s Moscow stores, IKEA brought in 
generators to ensure that the store could operate as planned. In fact, after this incident, the 
company made it a general practice to have a generator in every one of its Russian stores 
(Loshak, 2010). Thus, while IKEA attempted to use connections and networks to its 
advantage, it also recognized the unreliability of Russian officials and the necessity of 
creating an independent contingency plan. 
It seems, then, that IKEA was able to overcome many of the obstacles of blat, 
first by working to gain a better understanding of the system, then by further building 
trust and becoming an insider in the exclusive blat networks. Indeed, Elg et al. argue that 
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it was these very activities that determined IKEA’s success in entering the Russian 
market (2008). Furthermore, IKEA endeavored to guard itself against the uncertainty of 
the Russian market by attempting to maintain a certain level of independence. In addition 
to cultivating close relationships with officials, IKEA took measures to ensure that it 
could continue to operate even without the support of local officials. This strategy, which 
was a creative and unique combination of the use of business networks and the 
maintenance of relative independence, contributed to IKEA’s initial success in the 
Russian market.  
More recent evidence, however, would suggest that not all is well. IKEA has run 
into several difficulties that have led it to reevaluate its approach to the Russian market. 
One case that proved particularly frustrating to IKEA executives was the opening of a 
store in Samara. Despite years of preparation and consultation with local officials, the 
opening of IKEA’s new store in Samara was postponed nine times. The most recent 
reason that Russian officials cited for delaying the opening was that the building for the 
store was not adequately built to withstand hurricanes – a prospect that seems rather 
unlikely in the Volga region (Loshak, 2010). Frustrated, IKEA announced a halting of 
investment in Russia “due to the unpredictability of the administrative processes in some 
regions” (Toohey, 2011). Outside observers have interpreted this statement as code for 
IKEA’s exasperation with the rampant corruption in Russia (Kramer, 2009a). The 
Samara store only opened in September 2011 after a four-year delay, undoubtedly costing 
IKEA millions of dollars in lost revenue. 
The Samara case closely resembles an earlier incident in Nizhnii Novgorod. In 
2006, an IKEA store in Nizhnii Novgorod was forced to close for a period of thirty days 
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when authorities determined the store did not comply fully with fire safety regulations. 
The forced closure, which occurred just before the holiday season, was estimated to have 
cost the company up to 50 million dollars (Miliaev, Chichurina, Savel'ev & Morozova, 
2006). In both of these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the delays and closures were 
not based on actual safety concerns, but instead on an attempt to extort money from the 
company in exchange for permission to operate the stores. These incidents persuasively 
demonstrate that even the most creative business practices are subject to setbacks due to 
corruption. Despite IKEA’s concerted effort at establishing useful connections while 
simultaneously maintaining a significant degree of independence, it was still subject to 
the whims of local authorities. Had IKEA been able to establish more reliable blat 
connections with the authorities in question, they might not have experienced such delays 
and difficulties. 
IKEA has also run into problems with executives within its own ranks. In 2010, 
IKEA founder Ingvar Kamprad learned that a Russian executive at IKEA was reportedly 
taking kickbacks from the company that provided IKEA with its prized generators. In 
exchange, the executive convinced top IKEA leadership to overpay for the use of the 
generators. As a result, IKEA had overpaid by about 200 million dollars. Adding insult to 
injury, IKEA terminated the contract with the generator company, only to be slapped 
with a five million euro fine by Russian courts for breaking the terms of the contract 
(Loshak, 2010). In December 2011, Russian authorities accused another IKEA manager 
of attempting to extort a bribe from a local businessman who wanted to rent space at one 
of the company’s Moscow shopping centers (Mauldin, 2011).  
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In February of 2010, IKEA fired the director of its operations in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Per Kaufman, and the director of its operations in Russia, Stefan Gross. 
The two executives were fired for giving bribes to an energy company in St. Petersburg, 
in order to ensure that the IKEA store there would have power. At the time, Russian 
newspapers seemed puzzled by the firings – after all, the officials were giving bribes to 
advance the interests of their company, not taking them for their own self-interest 
(Taranov, 2010). This attitude demonstrates the difference in approach to ethics in the 
two countries. Whereas American business ethics would condemn bribery as 
unequivocally corrupt, the Russian mindset sees it as an acceptable – and perhaps 
necessary – measure to ensure a company's survival.  
Regardless of what Russian standards might dictate when it comes to business 
ethics, this pattern of corruption is particularly damning for IKEA. The company has 
spoken out forcefully against corruption in the past. In a statement on its website, the 
company emphasizes that it “works proactively to prevent corruption and illegal ctivities 
and disassociates itself from corruption in any form, whether direct or indirect” (IKEA 
Group, 2011). Indeed, from the very beginning of its entry into the Russian market, IKEA 
made it clear that it intended to follow its own rules and ethical principles (Loshak, 
2010), and the company has been one of the most outspoken Western corporate critics of 
Russian corruption since opening its first store in the country in 2000 (Kramer, 2009b). 
IKEA’s 2009 decision to halt investment also indicates the extent of the 
corruption problem in Russia, given that IKEA runs many international outlets and is 
“hardly thin-skinned when it comes to dealing with bureaucracies” (Kramer, 2009a). The 
problem, most likely, lies in the incompatibility of IKEA’s corporate values and the 
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measures that are often necessary to run a successful business in Russia. Even though 
IKEA was able to adjust to the Russian market and make the necessary connections there, 
it is still held to the standards of Western businesses, and is therefore unable to justify 
corrupt business tactics. Although blat does not necessarily entail bribery or extortion, it 
can facilitate it. It appears that IKEA managers in Russia had difficulty toeing the line 
between cultivating useful business connections and engaging in corruption. The 
accusations and admissions of corruption indicate that IKEA’s market entry strategy of 
using blat connections may have backfired as they are forced to face international ethics 
standards. 
Indeed, IKEA executives appear to have been caught off guard by the problems 
that the Russia branch of the company encountered. The founder of the company, Ingvar 
Kamprad, expressed his dismay in a 2010 press release: “The documented general 
disorder inside our Russian shopping center company is totally unacceptable. I have been 
over-optimistic. It is shocking and sad that our organization got carried away” (IKEA 
Group, 2010). The same press release announced that the company had undertaken 
multiple reviews of its operations in Russia, and that these reviews showed “large 
deficiencies in several areas.” With regards to the problems surrounding bribery, IKEA 
admitted in the statement that “there are indications that within IKEA MOS there has 
been a culture of accepting third parties who have engaged in unethical business 
practices.” The company committed itself to “strengthening its compliance and control 
mechanisms in this area” (IKEA Group, 2010). It is unclear, however, whether these 
efforts will be successful, and whether IKEA will be able to continue its growth and 
expansion in the unpredictable Russian market. 
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No matter what the future may hold for IKEA’s Russian operations, the problems 
encountered in the country clearly and persuasively demonstrate that even the most 
resourceful, creative business practices, implemented by a company with extensive 
international experience, are subject to the uncertainties of the Russian market. 
Corruption, and blat practices in particular, remains a deterrent to international 
companies who would otherwise find significant success in Russia. For IKEA, despite 
extensive efforts to adapt to the Russian market, the ultimate determinant of success or 
failure was the incompatibility of Russian business practices with international ethics 
standards. By trying to bridge this gap and engage in blat practices, IKEA found itself 
embroiled in practices that, while acceptable in the Russian business environment, ran 
entirely counter to the spirit of the company’s commitment to anti-corruption. IKEA, 
even as one of the most experienced corporations in international market entry, was 
unable to reconcile this conflict, and it ultimately led to the firing of top officials, the 
suspension of investment in Russia, and the loss of significant amounts of potential 
revenue. IKEA’s experience suggests that, at least for the time being, Western companies 
will be unlikely to succeed in the Russian market because of the ethical problems 
associated with blat. Even those companies, that, like IKEA, spend significant time and 
effort learning about and participating in blat networks will eventually encounter ethical 
problems.  
IKEA’s experience with blat in the Russian business environment can be 
instructive for other Western multinationals that are interested in investing there. While 
the current state of the Russian business environment is not encouraging, there are some 
tentative recommendations that can be drawn from knowledge of blat practices. IKEA’s 
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experience indicates that while the use of blat and network capitalism may initially 
provide Western corporations with multiple business advantages, it can ultimately lead to 
ethical problems that can completely derail the company’s activity in Russia. Thus, the 
recommendations of many scholars familiar with the Russian market, who advise that 
Westerners avoid engaging in blat, seem most prudent (Barnes et al., 1997; Michailova & 
Worm, 2003). Avoidance of blat may decrease the level of success of Western businesses 
entering the Russian market, or prevent them from doing business there altogether. 
However, this option is far preferable to the public relations and legal problems 
associated with accusations of corruption. 
If Western companies do shy away from investment in Russia, of course, it will 
certainly be detrimental to the country’s integration into the world economy. Therefore, 
Russia has a clear interest in discouraging the use of blat practices in business. Although 
President Medvedev has announced his intent to combat corruption, little improvement 
has actually been noted over the course of his four years as president. Furthermore, the 
Russian government has only shown inclination to fight corruption when it surfaces 
publicly. Instead, it should focus on discouraging those practices, including blat, that 
create the conditions for corruption to occur. In the meantime, blat will continue to deter 
Western corporations from investing in Russia, and to cause problems for those who do 
choose to do business there.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has shown how a peculiar social phenomenon, deeply rooted in the 
idiosyncrasies of the Soviet system, continues to affect business in contemporary Russia. 
The use of connections and personal favors to do business is particularly detrimental to 
foreign investors, who are often excluded from the Russian networks that have formed. 
Furthermore, attempts to participate in the blat system of Russian capitalism often lead 
foreign companies into ethical quagmires and, consequently, public relations difficulties. 
As demonstrated by IKEA’s experience in Russia, even the most well-prepared, cautious, 
and creative companies will struggle with the challenges of blat. However, much research 
remains to be done in order to fully understand the effect that blat practices have on 
Western companies investing in Russia. 
While the case of IKEA’s entry into the Russian market is instructive, it is just 
one well-publicized example of the problems faced by foreign companies in Russia. In 
order to perform a more conclusive assessment of blat’s effect on foreign investors, we 
would need to examine the experiences of other foreign companies as well. A more 
comprehensive survey of managers of Western multinationals who have invested in 
Russia would provide much more information on the various problems foreign 
companies encounter. Furthermore, it would allow us to trace the commonalities in 
various companies’ experiences in order to determine more conclusively how blat 
disadvantages Western firms. Although the case of IKEA was helpful in testing the 
hypothesis that blat is detrimental to foreign companies, much more research remains to 
be done to support these initial findings. 
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The question that remains to be addressed is whether the trends observed in this 
paper are likely to continue in the long term. Many observers of the Russian business 
scene have predicted that as Russia becomes more integrated into the global economy, 
the idiosyncrasies that have plagued its development in the past will begin to disappear, 
and it will conform more to international norms. This would mean that foreign firms 
would eventually find it easier to invest in Russia, as the barriers to entry – blat included 
– disappear. However, as this paper has shown, blat is a deeply embedded cultural 
phenomenon that has endured momentous political and economic transitions. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that the practice will disappear any time soon. In any case, it is clear 
that blat is currently one of the main obstacles to investment, and therefore development, 
in Russia. This paper serves as a cautionary tale both to foreign firms and to the Russian 
government. For Western multinationals, the prevalence of blat practices and the 
difficulties experienced by IKEA indicate that particular care is necessary when making 
the decision to enter the Russian market. For the Russian government, the findings 
outlined here demonstrate the importance of pursuing real reform that discourages blat. 
Otherwise, Russian development will continue to stall, leaving it further and further 
behind the rest of the global economy. 
 50 
Bibliography 
Aidis, R. & Adachi, Y. (2007). Russia: Firm entry and survival barriers. Economic 
Systems 31(4), 391-411. 
Aidis, R., Estrin, S., & Miskiewicz, T. (2008). Institutions and entrepreneurship 
development in Russia: A comparative perspective. Journal of Business Venturing 
23(6), 656-672. 
Ariño, A., Abramov, M., Skorobogatykh, I., Rykounina, I., & Vila, J. (1997). Partner 
Selection and Trust Building in West European-Russian Joint Ventures: A Western 
Perspective. International Studies of Management & Organization 24(1), 19-37. 
Barnes, J.W., Crook, M. H., Koybaeva, T., & Stafford, E.R. (1997). Why Our Russian 
Alliances Fail. Long Range Planning 30(4), 540-550. 
Batjargal, B. (2003). Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Performance in Russia: A 
Longitudinal Study. Organization Studies 24(4), 535-556. 
Berliner, J. (1957). Factory and Manager in the USSR. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Brady, R. (1999). Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free its Economy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Bruno, M. (1997). Women and the Culture of Entrepreneurship. In M. Buckley (Ed.), 
Post-Soviet women: from the Baltic to Central Asia (pp. 56-74). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
51 
 
Brus, W. & Laski, K. (1983). Repressed Inflation and Second Economy Under Central 
Planning. In W. Gaertner & A. Wenig (Eds.), The Economics of the Shadow 
Economy (pp. 377-388). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Bulgakov, M. (1968). Heart of a Dog (M. Ginsburg, Trans.) New York: Grove Press. 
Butler, B. & Purchase, S. (2004). Personal Networking in Russian Post Soviet Life. 
Research and Practice in Human Resource Management 12(1), 34-60.  
Colloudon, V. (1998). Privatization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite. The Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs, 22(2), 43-56. 
Elg, U., Ghauri, P., & Tarnovskaya, V. (2008). The role of networks and matching in 
market entry to emerging retail markets. International Marketing Review 25(6), 
674-699. 
Faitelberg, M. (Director). (2004). Eliseevsky. Kaznit’. Nel’zia pomilovat’ [Motion 
picture]. Russia: Rossiia 1. 
Fasmer, M. (1964). Etimologicheskii slovar’ russkogo iazyka. Moscow: Russian 
Language. 
Fey, C. F. & Denison, D. R. (2003). Organizational Culture and Effectiveness: Can 
American Theory Be Applied in Russia? Organization Science 14(6), 686-706. 
Fitzpatrick, S. (1999). Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press. 
Frydman, R., Murphy, K., & Rapaczynski, A. (1998). Capitalism with a Comrade’s 
Face: Studies in the Postcommunist Transition. Budapest: Central European 
University Press. 
52 
 
Fuxman, L. (1997). Ethical Dilemmas of Doing Business in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Journal 
of Business Ethics 16(12), 1273-1282. 
Gehlbach, S. (2001). Social Networks and Corruption. Paper presented at the 2001 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. 
Goldman, M. I. (2003). The Piratization of Russia: Russian reform goes awry. New 
York: Routledge. 
Grossman, G. (1982). The “Shadow Economy” in the Socialist Sector of the USSR. In 
The CMEA Five-Year Plans (1981-1985) in a New Perspective: Planned and Non-
Planned Economies (pp. 99-115). Brussels: NATO. 
Grushin, B. A. (2003). Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo 
mneniia. Epokha Brezhneva. Moscow: Progress Traditsiia. 
Hoffman, D. (2002). The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia. New York: 
Public Affairs. 
Huber, P. & Wörgötter, A. (1998). Political Survival or Entrepreneurial Development? 
Observations on Russian Business Networks. In S. Cohen, A. Schwartz, and J. 
Zysman (Eds.), The Tunnel at the End of the Light: Privatization, Business 
Networks, and Economic Transformation in Russia. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Humphrey, C. (2002). The Unmaking of Soviet Life: Everyday Economies After 
Socialism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Hunter, J. G. (2003). Determinants of business success under “hypocapitalism” Case 
studies of Russian firms and their strategies. Journal of Business Research 56(2), 
113-120. 
53 
 
IKEA Group. (2010, December 10). A new course for IKEA MOS Shopping Center 
Company in Russia. Retrieved April 7, 2012, from http://www.ikea.com/ms/fi_FI/ 
 about_ikea/pdf/MOSreviewsPressEng.pdf?icid=fi%3Eic%3Epressroom%3EIKEA
MOS 
IKEA Group. (2011). No Place for Corruption. In IWAY, Our Code of Conduct. Retrieved 
April 7, 2012, from http://www.ikea.com/ms/en_AU/about_ikea/our_responsiblity/ 
  iway/index.html 
Ivanova, A. (2011). Izobrazhenie defitsita v sovetskoi kul’ture vtoroi poloviny 1960-x – 
pervoi poloviny 1980-x godov. Neprikosnovennyi zapas 77(3). 
Jansson, H., Johanson, M., & Ramström, J. (2007). Institutions and business networks: A 
comparative analysis of the Chinese, Russian, and West European markets. 
Industrial Marketing Management 36(7), 955-967. 
Karklins, R. (2005). The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist 
Societies. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kornai, J. (1980). Economics of Shortage. New York: North-Holland Publishing 
Company. 
Kramer, A. E. (2009a, June 23). Ikea Plans to Halt Investment in Russia. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/business/global/ 
  24ruble.html 
Kramer, A. E. (2009b, September 11). Ikea Tries to Build Public Case Against Russian 
Corruption. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/ 
  2009/09/12/business/global/12ikea.html?pagewanted=all 
54 
 
Kuznetsov, A. & Kuznetsova, O. (2005). Business Culture in Modern Russia: Deterrents 
and Influences. Problems and Perspectives in Management 2, 25-31. 
Lebedev-Kumach, V. (1933). Blat-not. Krokodil 3(3). 
Ledeneva, A. (1998) Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Ledeneva, A. (2008). Blat and Guanxi: Informal Practices in Russia and China. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 50(1), 118-144. 
Loshak, A. (2010, March 5). Zakorotilo. Open Space. Retrieved April 7, 2012, from 
http://www.openspace.ru 
Marrese, M. (1981). The Evolution of Wage Regulation in Hungary. In P. Hare, H. 
Radice & N. Swain (Eds.), Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform (pp. 54-80). 
London: Unwin Hyman.  
Mauldin, W. (2011, December 19). Russia Accuses IKEA Manager of Extorting Bribe. 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
  SB10001424052970204791104577108183132051566.html 
Michailova, S. & Worm, V. (2003). Personal Networking in Russia and China: Blat and 
Guanxi. European Management Journal 21, 509-519. 
Miliaev, P., Chichurina, E., Savel’ev, A. & Morozova, O. (2006, December 1). Chernyi 
mesiats “IKEA”. Vedomosti. Retrieved April 7, 2012 from 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2006/12/01/116890 
Millar, J. (1988). The Little Deal: Brezhnev's Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism. In T. 
Thompson and R. Sheldon (Eds.), Soviet Society & Culture (pp. 3-19). London: 
Westview Press. 
55 
 
O’Hearn, D. (1980). The Consumer Second Economy: Size and Effects. Soviet Studies 
23(2), 218-234. 
Poluian, V. (1976). Odnazhdy v studenuiu zimniuiu poru. Krokodil 1(6). 
Puffer, S. & McCarthy, D. (1995). Finding the Common Ground in Russian and 
American Business Ethics. California Management Review 37(2), 29-46. 
Puffer, S. & McCarthy, D. (2001). Navigating the hostile maze: A framework for Russian 
entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Executive 15(4), 24-36. 
Puffer, S. & McCarthy, D. (2007). Can Russia’s state-managed, network capitalism be 
competitive? Institutional pull versus institutional push. Journal of World Business 
42(1), 1-13. 
Puffer, S. & McCarthy, D. (2011). Two Decades of Russian Business and Management 
Research: An Institutional Theory Perspective. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 25. 
Puffer, S., McCarthy, D., & Boisit, M. (2010). Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: 
The Impact of Formal Institutional Voids. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
34(3), 441-467. 
Richer Russians: The growth of Russia’s middle class. (2011, March 2). The Economist. 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/03/daily-chart-
0 
Robski, O. (2006). Casual. (A. W. Bouis, Trans.). New York: Harper Collins. 
Russian Research Center, Harvard University. (1950). Project on the Soviet Social 
System: Interview Records. 
56 
 
Sampson, S. L. (1987). The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 493, 120-
136. 
Seryi, A. (Director). (1976). Ty – mne, ya – tebe [Motion picture]. USSR: Mosfilm. 
Sorokin, V. (1983). The Queue. (S. Laird, Trans.). New York: New York Review of 
Books. 
Taranov, S. (2010, February 18). Skandal v IKEA: prodolzhenie ne posleduet? Chastnyi 
Korrespondent. Retrieved April 7, 2012 from http://www.chaskor.ru/article/ 
  skandal_v_ikea_prodolzhenie_ne_posleduet_15321 
Taylor, T. C. & Kazakov, A. Y. (1997). Business ethics and civil society in Russia. 
International Studies of Management and Organization 27(1), 5-18. 
Toohey, N. (2011, September 30). Ikea opens in Samara after four-year delay. The 
Moscow News. Retrieved April 8, 2012 from http://themoscownews.com/ 
business/20110930/189084847.html 
Transparency International. (2011). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved March 21, 
2012, from http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults 
U.S. Department of Justice. (1998). Anti-Bribery and Books & Records Provisions of The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Utekhin, I. (2007). Blat (iz kommentariev dlia muzeiia). Retrieved February 1, 2012, 
from http://utekhin.ya.ru/replies.xml?item_no=61 
Venard, B. (2009). Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption: An Empirical Research 
in Russia. Journal of Business Ethics 89, 59-76. 
57 
 
Wilson, D. & Donaldson, L. (1996). Russian Etiquette & Ethics in Business. Chicago: 
NTC Publishing Group. 
World Bank. (2011). Data retrieved March 21, 2012 from World Development Indicators 
Online (WDI) database. 
World Bank. (2012). Economy Rankings. Retrieved March 19, 2012, from 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings 
 
